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I. INTRODUCTION
Liberalism is the view that the state should not, except on mutually
justifiable grounds, coerce a society’s citizens to adopt, support, or follow 
some particular comprehensive conception of the good.1  So understood,
* © 2017 Samuel C. Rickless.  Professor of Philosophy, University of California, 
San Diego. Ph.D. 1996, University of California, Los Angeles; B.Phil. 1988, Oxford University; 
B.A. 1986, Harvard University. 
1. See Gerald F. Gaus, The Place of Autonomy Within Liberalism, in AUTONOMY
AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS 272, 274 (John Christman & Joel 
Anderson eds., 2005) (“The liberal tradition in moral and political philosophy maintains 
that each person has a moral claim to do as he wishes until some justification is offered 
for limiting his liberty.”); see also 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
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a liberal state, by definition, permits each citizen a zone of freedom
delimited by her own understanding of the ingredients of a happy life.
Liberalism, as a normative theory governing state–citizen (and, indirectly, 
citizen–citizen) relations, is opposed by various forms of totalitarianism,
including theocracy and communism.2  A theocratic state is one that
imposes a particular religious form of life on its citizens, and thereby
restricts their freedom to act in ways that the state considers heretical.  A
communist state is one that imposes a particular economic form of life on
its citizens, and thereby restricts their freedom to engage in economic 
activity that the state considers exploitative or alienating. 
Looking back at the clash of ideologies represented by, among others, 
the Crusades, the European wars of religion, anti-Jewish pogroms, the war 
against fascism, the war against colonialism, the Cold War, and the anti-
apartheid movement, many believe that liberalism is the form of political 
organization that is most congenial to human society.  Human beings, in 
the aggregate, find illiberalism unduly constraining, disrespectful, degrading, 
and oppressive; and when prevented from organizing themselves into
cooperative ventures for mutual advantage that rest on broad guarantees of
liberty and equal respect, they are ready and willing to sacrifice everything 
in the fight against despotism and tyranny.  Unfortunately, there remain
many supporters of various totalizing ideologies, most notably radical
religious movements, about whom the same may be said.3 
Politically, it is sometimes possible for the conflict between liberals and 
illiberals to be resolved, without war or civil strife, at the ballot box or in
the courtroom.  This is what has happened in numerous societies in the 
LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 14 (1984) (“[Liberal] should refer to one who has so powerful a 
commitment to liberty that he is motivated to limit the number of acknowledged liberty-
limiting principles as narrowly as possible . . . .”).
2. See JERZY SZACKI, LIBERALISM AFTER COMMUNISM 64 (Chester A. Kisiel trans., 
Cent. European Univ. Press 1995) (1994) (“[T]he thesis on the anti-liberal nature of
communism seems self-evident . . . .”); Robert B. Thigpen & Lyle A. Downing, Rawls and 
the Challenge of Theocracy to Freedom, 40 J. CHURCH & ST. 757, 757 (1998) (“Theocracy
is a major alternative to the liberal political order in the world today, as it was during the
period that gave birth to liberalism.”). 
3. See Tim Lister et al., ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries Have Killed
2,043, CNN (Feb. 13, 2017, 11:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-
isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html [https://perma.cc/WY49-EMRM] (“Since declaring 
its caliphate in June 2014, the self-proclaimed Islamic State has conducted or inspired 
more than 140 terrorist attacks in 29 countries other than Iraq and Syria.”). 
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case of Sunday laws,4 anti-blasphemy laws,5 religious tests for public
office,6 as well as laws banning polygamy,7 contraception,8 voluntary
euthanasia,9 sexual relations between persons of the same sex,10 same-sex 
marriage,11 and the ingestion of controlled substances.12  But when ideology 
and rhetoric combine in potentially incendiary ways, political conflict can
spill over into violence, as when abortion clinics are bombed and abortion 
providers shot to death,13 or it can spill into dehumanizing barbarism, as 
4. See Alan Raucher, Sunday Business and the Decline of Sunday Closing Laws:
A Historical Overview, 36 J. CHURCH & ST. 13, 13 (“Sunday closing laws, once deeply
embedded in American government practice and public behavior, have largely vanished 
or become inconsequential in the United States.”).
5. Angelina E. Theodorou, Which Countries Still Outlaw Apostasy and Blasphemy?, 
PEW RES. CTR. (July 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-
countries-still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/ [https://perma.cc/4XF9-UESP].
6. Angelina E. Theodorou, In 30 Countries, Heads of State Must Belong to a 
Certain Religion, PEW RES. CTR. (July 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 
2014/07/22/in-30-countries-heads-of-state-must-belong-to-a-certain-religion/ [https://perma.cc/
Z77M-5PP3].
7. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., UNITED NATIONS, POPULATION FACTS: WORLD
MARRIAGE PATTERNS 4 (2011), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/
publications/pdf/popfacts/PopFacts_2011-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7J9-LHYY].
8. See Martha J. Bailey et al., Early Legal Access: Laws and Policies Governing 
Contraceptive Access, 1960–1980, at 3–5 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www- 
personal.umich.edu/~baileymj/ELA_laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNN5-AH7E]. 
9. Euthanasia & Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAS) Around the World: Legal Status in
28 Countries from Australia to Uruguay, PROCON.ORG, http://euthanasia.procon.org/view. 
resource.php?resourceID=000136 [https://perma.cc/BB8P-ENZP] (last updated July 20, 
2016, 7:31 AM). 
10. Siobhan Fenton, LGBT Relationships are Illegal in 74 Countries, Research 
Finds, INDEP. (May 17, 2016, 11:28 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/gay-
lesbian-bisexual-relationships-illegal-in-74-countries-a7033666.html [https://perma.cc/
U4Z6-MET6].
11. Drew DeSilver, A Global Snapshot of Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June
4, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/04/global-snapshot-sex-marriage/
[https://perma.cc/65SS-5X7Q].
12. Georgia Graham, Drug Laws Around the World—Does Anyone Get It Right?, 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 30, 2014, 11:10 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
crime/11197559/Drug-laws-around-the-world-does-anyone-get-it-right.html. 
13. Liam Stack, A Brief History of Deadly Attacks on Abortion Providers, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/29/us/30abortion-
clinic-violence.html?_r=0.
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when young people at a rock concert are systematically executed for pursuing
a lifestyle that runs contrary to religious commandments.14 
Because “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” the 
hope of many philosophers and political theorists is to find a way of justifying
liberalism to those who find it unfair, disrespectful, or simply unduly
constraining.15 For if liberalism can be justified, then the refusal of illiberals 
to accept principles of non-coercion becomes unreasonable, their claims
of mistreatment and exclusion may legitimately be dismissed, and—should 
they turn to violence in pursuit of their totalizing ends—they may be rightfully 
imprisoned or, if necessary, killed in defense of the liberal state. 
But this hope has run headlong into what appears to be an insurmountable 
dilemma. For in justifying liberalism, it seems, the liberal theorist must
(logically) either make appeal to, or abjure reliance on, a comprehensive
(or partial) conception of the good.  If the liberal theorist appeals to a
conception of the good, she is vulnerable to the charge of incoherence or 
unfairness.  For her rejection of a social order organized around a particular 
conception of the good itself depends on a particular, and oftentimes rival, 
conception of the good. But if the theorist refuses to appeal to a conception 
of the good, then her defense of liberalism either rests on foundations too 
weak to support such a strong conclusion or ends up presupposing substantive
axioms that make a mockery of her aspiration to axiological neutrality. 
My aim in this Article is to clarify the nature of this dilemma and then 
explain how the liberal can avoid it. The major flaw in classical (whether 
comprehensivist or neutralist) defenses of liberalism is that they take the 
form of arguments resting on premises that, it is hoped, are acceptable to 
illiberals.  This way lies inevitable failure.  The key to defending liberalism 
is to turn the tables on the illiberal (such as the theocrat, the communist,
or the fascist), by demonstrating that commitment to liberal principles is,
at least in the case of most contemporary ideologies, a necessary condition 
of the very possibility of illiberalism.  In Kantian terminology, I will construct 
a transcendental justification of liberalism.  If I am right, the contemporary 
illiberal is hoist with his own petard: any reason he tries to offer against
liberalism is self-defeating, and thus his only reasonable alternative is
silence.
 14. Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks ‘First of
the Storm,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/ 
isis-claims-responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miracles.html.
15. The quotation comes from CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard
& Peter Paret eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1832).  Clausewitz’s point is 
different from mine, but his words are naturally used to express the point made in the text.
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The history of liberalism is framed by its reaction to eudaimonistic and 
theocentric conceptions of the good. Various schools of thought in
ancient Greece differed with respect to the nature of the good, some taking
it to be knowledge (Stoics),16 others pleasure and the absence of pain 
(Epicureans),17 and yet others a relatively fortunate life of activity in
accordance with virtue (Aristotelians).18  It was a commonplace notion
among the ancients that the city-state should be organized in such a way 
as to achieve its own good or the good of its (male, non-enslaved) citizens. 
As Christianity gained more adherents and became ascendant across Europe,
the eudaimonistic conception of the good—thanks in part to the efforts of 
Catholic philosophers and theologians—was folded into a theocentric account 
of human nature. Catholic doctrine did not give up the idea of the summum 
bonum; rather, it identified it with something other-worldly, a supernatural
union of the human soul with God in the afterlife.19  This theocentric account 
of human happiness went hand-in-hand with a theocentric account of state 
legitimacy, according to which monarchs—descended from Adam by
primogeniture—ruled by divine right and dispensation.
 16. See Dirk Baltzly, Stoicism, in  STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 5
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/ [https://perma.cc/
CF7Q-H8QU] (stating that “the Stoics identify the moral virtues with knowledge” and 
“virtue is the only good”). 
17. See Tim O’Keefe, Epicurus, in INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 5a,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epicur/#SH5a [https://perma.cc/2QZE-U64U] (“Epicurus agrees 
with Aristotle that happiness is the highest good.  However, he disagrees with Aristotle by
identifying happiness with pleasure.”).
18. See Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
§ 2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#Hum 
GooFunArg [https://perma.cc/W3VJ-XQ3A] (“[Happiness] consists in those lifelong activities
that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul.”).
19. See John O’Callaghan, Saint Thomas Aquinas, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY §12.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/#Virt
[https://perma.cc/57RE-2XQC] (“Thomas first distinguishes a twofold happiness for human
beings. One is the sort of happiness that is achievable by a human agent in this life through
the exercise of the powers he or she is endowed with by nature. . . .  However, Thomas 
adds that there is ‘another’ happiness that cannot be achieved simply by the exercise of
the human powers without divine supernatural assistance.  This is a happiness not to be 
found perfectly in this life, but only in the next.  It is beatitudo or blessedness strictly
speaking.  It consists in the intellectual vision of God and all things ‘in’ God.” (citation
omitted)).
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The claim that a ruler’s function is to guide his subjects towards a better
relation to God after death following the dictates of church orthodoxy was 
put under significant pressure after the Reformation and during the
Enlightenment.20  Philosophers such as John Locke defended the view
(itself grounded in a natural theology established by rational argument) 
that human beings are naturally free and equal, and that society is founded
on the agreement of its members to entrust the protection of their natural 
rights to a sovereign.21  Intellectuals such as John Milton argued that freedom
of thought and expression is the most efficient means of discovering the 
truth, even in theological matters.22  Immanuel Kant hailed the autonomy
of human beings, and, in particular, their ability to use reason without 
the guidance of another, insisting that freedom is necessary to the achievement
of enlightenment.23  And political reformers, such as John Stuart Mill, 
defended the idea that freedom, encapsulated in experiments in living, 
conduces to human happiness, defined hedonistically, with greater weight
given to higher pleasures in the utilitarian calculus.24 
This history presents us with various forms of illiberalism followed by 
a panoply of comprehensive arguments for liberalism based on the idea 
that freedom of thought and expression (among other freedoms) is needed
to achieve one or other critical ingredient of the greatest good for human
beings. On a Lockean view, the good can be achieved only if one acquires 
knowledge of what is good and why, knowledge requires truth, and the 
truth can be discovered only by the largely unrestricted use of natural
reason. On a Kantian view, humans cannot achieve the summum bonum
unless the satisfaction of their deepest desires is in proportion to the goodness 
of their will, a state of being in which they are self-legislating, that is,
autonomous, and autonomy presupposes freedom.25  On a Millian conception,
 20. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xxii–xxiv (expanded ed. 2005)
[hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM] (discussing the consequences of the 
Reformation and the division of Christianity on the development of political liberalism).
21. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269, 330–31 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press student ed. 1988) (1690). 
22. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY
OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 25 (John W. Hales ed., Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1894) (1644). 
23. See IMMANUEL KANT, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’
(1784), reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS 54–59 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d, 
enlarged ed. 1991).
24. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in 18 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JOHN STUART MILL: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY 213, 260, 266 (J.M. Robson ed.,
1977).
25. See  SUSAN MENDUS, TOLERATION AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 89 (1989).
For contemporary autonomy-based defenses of liberalism, see id. at 89, 91–93 (1989), and
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS
75, 80–81, 152–55 (1995). 
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happiness is largely a function of higher pleasures, intellectual achievements
among them; and such achievements require freedom of thought, inquiry, and
association. And contemporary liberal theorists, such as William Galston, 
have taken up the mantle of Locke, Kant, and Mill within a framework
that identifies liberalism as the best means of securing a variety of
incommensurable goods that are necessary for human happiness, among them
life, the normal development of basic capacities, the fulfillment of interests,
knowledge, personal relationships, and the satisfaction of personal preferences.26 
For all these theorists, the proper defense of liberalism depends on a
comprehensive conception of the good (or, at least, a conception of
the basic components of the good).
However, as illiberals (and many non-comprehensive liberals) have
pointed out, arguments for liberalism based on a particular conception of 
the good life or a particular hierarchy of values (whether truth, virtue,
pleasure, autonomy, or some combination thereof is placed at the top of
the hierarchy) either fail on their own terms or treat illiberals with the kind 
of disrespect that is antithetical to the letter and spirit of liberalism itself.
The purpose of political theory is to articulate a conception of the state’s 
function and a correlative conception of the duties of citizenship that can
serve as a charter that can be endorsed by all (reasonable and rational)
members of society, no matter their own conceptions of the good or rank-
ordering of values.  Without such a charter, cooperation hangs by a thread
and social dissolution in times of stress beckons.  Even if the charter does 
not appeal ab initio to the atheist and the theist, the communist and the 
libertarian, the Epicurean and the Stoic alike, the liberal’s hope is that all
persons subject to the charter can be brought to recognize, by rational means 
rather than at the point of a gun, that its terms are capable of grounding a 
fair system of social cooperation.27  But to the theist, an argument for 
liberalism that ignores God’s will is unacceptable and unfair; to the
Epicurean, an argument for liberalism that is founded on the assumption 
that virtue is the highest good is wrong-headed; and to the libertarian, an 
argument for liberalism based on the motto “from each according to his
 26. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 174–77 (1991).
27. See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 20, at 133–40 (discussing 
the possibility of an overlapping consensus in political liberalism).
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ability, to each according to his needs!” is insulting.28 Given the existence 
of different and irreconcilable ways of ranking and measuring value, there 
is no way to ground uncoerced mutual acceptance of a liberal charter on 
any argument that presupposes a controversial conception of value.29 
This problem is not alleviated by pointing out that a liberal state— 
however unjustified its charter—permits its citizens to choose and act on 
illiberal conceptions of the good.  Neutrality of aim does not entail neutrality 
of justification: the fact that a liberal state does not have as a goal the
imposition of a particular conception of the good on its citizens does 
not mean that it is grounded in a theory that treats all citizens with equal 
respect.30  Moreover, in order to articulate stable terms of cooperation over 
time, the liberal charter must draw boundaries that define the limits of 
permissible action.  Without limits, any action is permitted; and if any action 
is permitted, then, given understandable conflicts that arise over scarce 
resources and disagreements stemming from different conceptions of 
value, the polity will eventually descend into anarchic violence and, potentially, 
self-destruction.  When the justification of the liberal state rests on a
particular conception of the good, the limits on permissible action will 
necessarily be defined by what is consistent with the achievement of the 
relevant good. For example, if the purpose of the liberal state is to secure
the conditions that make autonomy possible, then illiberal activities that 
reduce the autonomy of its citizens will be frowned upon or discouraged, 
and possibly forbidden.  Members of illiberal associations will find themselves 
28. This motto was popularized by Karl Marx in his Critique of the Gotha
Programme. KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 10 (C.P. Dutt ed., Int’l 
Publishers 1938) (1875). 
29. Some, for example, Richard J. Arneson, claim that the main problem with many 
illiberal views is that the arguments for them are “spectacularly weak and unequivocally
merit rejection.”  Richard Arneson, Political Liberalism, Religious Liberty, and Religious
Establishment, in  RELIGION AND THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 117, 136 (Hanoch 
Dagan et al. eds., 2014).  However, two things should be noted.  First, although this may
be true of religious claims such as that God exists, it is much more difficult to maintain 
with respect to non-religious comprehensive conceptions of the good.  Second, classifying
arguments as “weak” requires standards for evaluating arguments. The standards employed by
theists differ from the standards employed by atheists.  Arguably, there is no non-question-
begging way to prove that the standards employed by the latter are better than the standards 
employed by the former.  For whether that proof counts as good or bad depends on the 
standards whose reliability is at issue.  The transcendental argument I offer below offers a 
way out of both of these difficulties. See discussion infra Section VI. 
30. For a clear tripartite distinction—neutrality of aim, neutrality of justification,
neutrality of effect—, see Richard J. Arneson, Liberal Neutrality on the Good: An Autopsy,
in  PERFECTIONISM AND NEUTRALITY: ESSAYS IN LIBERAL THEORY 191, 193–94 (Steven 
Wall & George Klosko eds., 2003) (citing CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL
COMPLEXITY 50–55 (1987)). 
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prevented from acting as they wish on grounds that they could not reasonably
be expected to endorse. This should strike any liberal as unacceptable. 




Aware of the problems facing comprehensive or perfectionist justifications
for liberalism, defenders of the liberal state have turned to the idea of 
neutrality, impartiality, or fairness.  Using the nomenclature of Charles E. 
Larmore, the aim of non-comprehensive liberal theories is to provide a
“neutral justification of political neutrality.”31  Rather than ground their 
defense of freedom in a particular conception of the good, neutralist
liberals—as I will call them—appeal to principles that, so they hope, are 
actually accepted by or acceptable to all rational and reasonable people,
no matter their conceptions of the good or ranking of values.  For Larmore, 
the ground of liberalism lies in “a universal norm of rational dialogue,”
according to which the resolution of disagreement between parties requires
that each “prescind from the beliefs that the other rejects,” and in this way 
“retreat to neutral ground.”32  For Thomas Nagel, the ground lies in “a
highest-order framework of moral reasoning . . . which takes us outside 
ourselves to a standpoint that is independent of who we are,” a standpoint 
of impersonal impartiality.33 Within such a framework, one must be prepared 
“to submit one’s reasons to the criticism of others” according to common
standards of rationality and evidence, and to provide non-circular explanations 
of the errors of one’s opponents.34  For John Rawls, the ground lies in a
liberal principle of legitimacy, which holds that political power should be 
exercised only “in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which
all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”35 
For Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, the ground consists in commitment
to a norm of reciprocity, which requires “citizens and officials to justify
 31. LARMORE, supra note 30, at 53. 
32. Id.; see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10– 
11 (1980) (defending the claim that “the notion of constrained conversation should serve 
as the organizing principle of liberal thought” and stating that neutrality is a major
conversational constraint).
33. Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
215, 229 (1987). 
34. Id. at 232. 
35. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 20, at 137. 
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public policy by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who are 
bound by it.”36 
If the requirement of neutralist liberalism is that disagreement over 
coercive public policies be resolved by mutual retreat to common ground,
that is, a set of basic assumptions that are accepted by all parties, then the 
problem is that in modern societies such common ground as there is is too
thin to serve as a ground for liberal principles.  Neutralist liberals tend to
assume, overly optimistically, that controversies over abortion, same-sex
marriage, assisted suicide, and other divisive issues can be avoided if the
disputing parties agree to put aside their differences and focus on the 
common intersection of their belief-sets.37 But, although Party 1 may share 
a variety of basic beliefs with Party 2, and Party 2 may share a variety of 
basic beliefs with Party 3, and so on, the number of basic beliefs shared
by all contending parties in modern societies is vanishingly small.38  At
best, the disputants might all share belief in basic logic truths, such as the 
law of non-contradiction39 and the law of excluded middle.40  But, beyond 
this, disagreements obtain not just at the level of policy prescriptions—for
example, should abortion/same-sex marriage/assisted suicide be legally 
permitted?—but also at the level of fundamentals, that is, the basic premises 
that serve as the ultimate justification of the policy prescriptions.  Some 
citizens of the polity will appeal to religious authority, some to moral intuition, 
some to philosophical arguments, and others to a combination of one or 
more of these with empirical claims.  And although it might be possible 
in principle to adjudicate these disputes by using human reason, our long 
history of controversies that have yet to be resolved in this way strongly 
suggests that they are not (at least, practically speaking) eliminable.41  The
same problem obtains at higher levels of abstraction.  Every well-thought-
out affirmative answer to the question whether, for example, the right is 
prior to the good, has been met with an equally well-thought-out negative 
36. AMY GUTMANN&DENNIS THOMPSON,DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 52 (1996). 
37. ACKERMAN, supra note 32, at 4–12. 
38. For similar points directed against Ackerman’s Social Justice in the Liberal
State, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 9 (1991) [hereinafter PERRY, LOVE AND POWER].
39. Laurence R. Horn, Contradiction, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
§ 2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contradiction/ [https://
perma.cc/6374-8ZWH] (“No proposition may be simultaneously true and false.”). 
40. Id. (“Every proposition must be either true or false.”).
41. See, e.g., Leigh Ann Caldwell, Abortion: A Polarizing, Emotional Debate 41
Years After Court Ruling, CNN (Jan. 22, 2014, 8:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/ 
01/22/politics/abortion/index.html [https://perma.cc/4EXL-C3JN] (reporting that the abortion 
debate is “just as contentious today as it has ever been in the United States”).
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answer.42  If the only thing on which proponents of mutually incompatible
conceptions of the good agree is (at best!) the basic axioms of logic, then 
every neutralist defense of liberalism will fail. The standpoint of impersonal 
impartiality, neutrality, or reciprocity in a realm of public reason is a position 
from which it is logically impossible to argue for the restrictions on state 
power that are constitutive of a liberal polity.
Neutralist liberals are aware of this problem, but their prescription for 
solving it involves explicit or tacit appeal to a particular comprehensive 
conception of the good (or a particular ranking of values).  Religious beliefs
that justify human sacrifice, polygamy, or mass suicide are excluded from
the role of justifying coercive public policies because they are “unreasonable.”43 
Racist and sexist beliefs—even those grounded on empirical claims—are 
excluded as “non-moral.”44 At the limit, any belief systems incompatible
with the proposition that all citizens are free and equal, or that all are 
deserving of equal concern and respect, are ruled out of court.  This 
solution has all the advantages of theft over honest toil.  Suppose I hold a 
set of basic beliefs that a neutralist liberal excludes from the realm of
public reason as “unreasonable.”  Given that I am a citizen (or legislator) who 
is deserving of equal concern and respect, the neutralist liberal owes me a
justification for preventing me from appealing to these beliefs as reasons 
to support coercive public policies.  If the neutralist simply appeals to the
fact that my beliefs are “unreasonable,” then her or his defense of the exclusion
will be question-begging.  So the neutralist must appeal to a different
reason, something that justifies or grounds the claim that my beliefs are
“unreasonable.” That reason cannot lie in the axioms of logic, because,
as we have seen, these axioms are too thin to serve as a justification for any 
substantive thesis (including any claim of “unreasonableness”).  So it 
must lie in a substantive principle of some sort, a principle such as that
“all persons are moral equals” or “the universe is not ruled by a deity who 
42. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27–28 (rev. ed. 1999) (“[I]n 
justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good.”). But see, e.g., MICHAEL
J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, at xi (2d ed. 1998) (“[P]rinciples of 
justice depend for their justification on the moral worth or intrinsic good of the ends they
serve.”). 
43. See, e.g., LARMORE, supra note 30, at 66; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 20, at 217; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: 
The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHICS 468, 473 (1995); Nagel, supra note 33, at
221. 
44. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and Political Consensus, 
101 ETHICS 64, 69–70 (1990). 
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can be placated by humans” or “it is best for persons to let them lead their 
lives free of state interference.”  But these substantive principles either
encapsulate, or are inconsistent with one or more, particular conceptions 
of the good (or ranking of values).  This means that neutralist liberalism 
has collapsed into comprehensive liberalism, which is an ironic dialectical
twist, given that the very raison d’être of neutralism is to avoid the
problems of incoherence and unfairness that plague comprehensivism.
IV. MODUS VIVENDI? 
Some liberals, following some aspects of Thomas Hobbes’ strategy for
establishing the rationality of the social contract, argue that the justification 
dilemma leaves us with no option except to advocate for the liberal state
as a kind of modus vivendi.45  The idea is that a defense of freedom (to 
live, to speak, to associate with others, to practice one’s religion, to travel, 
to contract, and so on) must be based on a compromise, an agreement
based on the recognition by each party that it is either counterproductive 
or undesirable to use force in the attempt to achieve its (totalizing) ends.46 
How would the case for modus vivendi work in practice? Consider the
European wars of religion.  Looking back as a Protestant, one might reason 
that the attempt to root out Catholicism by killing or forcibly converting 
Catholics might well be successful in the short term, but that the relative 
size, intelligence, wealth, and power of the Catholic population might well 
result (as it has resulted in the past) in similar attempts to root out
Protestantism by killing or forcibly converting Protestants.47  Although the 
establishment of one’s own brand of Christianity is the most desirable
state of affairs, recognition of the existence of a relatively stable balance 
of power leads, at least rationally, to the recognition that there is a second-
best option that also serves as a second-best option for one’s adversaries. 
That option involves granting one’s adversaries the freedom to practice 
their religion in exchange for being allowed to practice one’s own religion.48
 45. See JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM 25, 133 (2000). 
46. See id. at 105–06 (stating that under modus vivendi liberalism, we will come to
think of human rights and freedom as convenient articles of peace, whereby individuals 
and communities with conflicting values and interests may consent to coexist peacefully).
47. See Leslie Griffin, Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 297, 306 (1997) (“For Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth century,
religious toleration was a modus vivendi because each group wanted to establish the true
religion.  If their power changed, then the modus vivendi would evaporate.  But political
justice in an overlapping consensus does not fluctuate with power.”). 
48. See  GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM: PUBLIC
REASON AS A POST-ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT 58 (2003) (“Whereas initially the minimum 
position of [Protestants and Catholics] was that the other be repressed (and so no compromise
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The state will then serve as a means of protecting each religious group 
from the violent excesses of fringe groups that view compromise as worse
than a fight to the death. 
This defense of liberalism, however, has serious drawbacks.  The first
problem is that the lack of an agreement between adversaries on basic
liberal principles entails that any modus vivendi is necessarily contingent, 
and hence hostage, to changing environments.49  If facts change in a way 
that leads one to perceive that the balance of power has shifted significantly 
in one’s own direction,50 then one will be sorely tempted to advance one’s
own primary agenda by breaking the peace.51  Over time, facts shift regularly 
in these ways, as attested to by the frequency of wars between independent
states in the last century. The point here is that we do not want a reason 
to accept liberal principles that is contingent on ever-changing circumstances; 
rather, we want a justification that is more robust and lasting than that. 
The second problem is that modus vivendi is a veritable recipe for the 
decimation or coercion of minorities.  Under a compromise regime, there
is no reason for a majority to agree to a system of governance that protects
the rights and freedoms of a distinct minority.  If the majority is strongly 
inclined to impose a totalitarian system on a small minority, and if the 
majority understands that the minority has no realistic way of resisting the
imposition, then it is more (instrumentally) rational for the majority to 
coerce or kill the minority than it is for the majority to compromise in a 
way that protects the minority.  The problem, then, is that modus vivendi
cannot solve the problem of plural totalistic ideologies by mutual agreement 
on the liberal state as a second best option unless each of the contending
parties is (perceived by all to be) powerful enough to disrupt or frustrate the 
main aims of the other parties.  Such a system might work (at least in the 
was possible), eventually Catholics came to accept that an acceptable minimum was that
they tolerate Protestants if Protestants tolerated Catholics (and, so too, with Protestants).”).
49. See John Horton, Realism, Liberal Moralism and a Political Theory of Modus
Vivendi, 9 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 431, 440 (explaining that modus vivendi is an “ongoing 
endeavor,” and to some degree, “precarious and susceptible to being undermined by any 
of the infinite variety of life’s contingencies”).
50. For example, the Catholic population appears to have been weakened by disease 
or famine, or sources of Catholic wealth appear to have dried up as a result of financial 
mismanagement. 
51. See Enzo Rossi, Modus Vivendi, Consensus, and (Realist) Liberal Legitimacy, 
2 PUB. REASON 21, 31 (2010) (“[M]odus vivendi is the product of a contingent balance of 
power between competing parties . . . .”); see also GAUS, supra note 48, at 63 (mentioning
that one problem of the agreement of modus vivendi is that individuals will constantly
reevaluate the agreement in light of shifting power relations).
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short term) to promote peace between Catholics and Protestants in various 
European countries. But, to take another example, it will not work to 
protect Christians in countries where Islam is dominant, and it will not
work to protect Muslims in countries where Christianity is dominant.
V. POLITICS? 
Some theorists object to any form of liberalism, whether comprehensive,
neutralist, or modus vivendi.52  For them, the appropriate recipe to reduce
social conflict produced by competing and irreconcilable conceptions of 
the good is politics.53  By this they mean that in the public square, where 
citizens debate the merits of coercive public policies, every argument should
have free rein.54  Citizens who are opposed to abortion should be free to 
appeal to religious doctrines as support for policies that prevent women
from ending their pregnancies; citizens who are opposed to the welfare 
state should be free to support its destruction by appeal to right-libertarian
principles; citizens who want to ban polygamy or same-sex marriage or 
assisted suicide should be able to support the ban using whatever arguments
they please.  And if a majority gets control of the state apparatus and restricts
the freedom of some, then that’s just the way the cookie crumbles.
But politics, so understood, is really just another recipe for oppression, 
tyranny, or chaos.  Politics works well in a system animated by liberal
principles, a system in which people are not only free to speak their minds, 
but also free from unjustified coercion or harm.  But when liberal principles
are disregarded, there is no framework for politics: all that is left is war. 
Sometimes, totalitarian tendencies are channeled directly into violence,
coercion, or intimidation: the mob shows up at your door and burns a cross 
on your lawn, or threatens you with harm if you do not do what they say.
But those same tendencies can also be channeled to the same ends indirectly: 
through elections for representatives who pass laws that restrict freedom
or worse. Anti-Jewish legislation passed in Nazi Germany in the 1930’s
included the exclusion of Jews from government service, from the bar,
from public schools, from editorial posts at newspapers and magazines, 
from the army, and even from health spas.55  Towards the end of the decade, 
Jews were forced to surrender their passports, to close their shops and 
52. See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church 
and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2255 (1997) (“All of liberalism’s efforts to accommodate
or tame illiberal forces fail, either by underestimating and trivializing the illiberal impulse, 
or by mirroring it.”).
53. See id. at 2293.
 54. See id.
 55. Antisemitic Legislation 1933–1939, in  HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.
ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007901 [https://perma.cc/3GML-SXYH].
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businesses, and to live in areas where their freedom of movement was
heavily circumscribed.56  And then, during the Second World War, Jews
were systematically herded into concentration camps, gassed, and shot.57 
All of these measures, and certainly the ones taken before the Nazi Party
established a de facto dictatorship, were the result of official votes taken
by official representatives in the official seat of government in accordance 
with official rules of debate and deliberation.58  “Politics,” as the noted 
legal scholar, Fanley Stish, once said, “is merely the continuation of war 
by other means.”  As such, it is not the answer to our problem: it is our
problem. 
VI. THE TRANSCENDENTAL STRATEGY
The justification dilemma establishes that, in a world of competing and 
irreconcilable conceptions of the good, no attempt to justify the liberal
state to illiberals can succeed. Practically speaking, modus vivendi is an 
unstable solution to this problem, and “politics” is just another name for
despotism or anarchy.  Is it possible to make a persuasive case for liberalism?
The mistake that liberals have been making is to suppose that the best
way to argue for liberalism is by offering reasoning to illiberals based on
premises that the latter do or could accept.  In fact, the best argument for 
liberalism is to show that any illiberal who wishes to live, work, and 
participate in society is caught in a practical contradiction, for someone 
who opposes liberalism under those circumstances is ipso facto committed to
liberal principles.  The argument is transcendental inasmuch as it establishes
that commitment to liberalism is a necessary condition of being a functioning 
illiberal in society.
In terms of its form, the transcendental argument for illiberalism is
similar to Aristotle’s argument for the principle of non-contradiction (PNC).59 
Aristotle notes that there is no good way to argue directly for the PNC: 
any deductive argument for the PNC would need to be based on premises
that are surer than the PNC itself, and this is impossible.  Instead, Aristotle 
challenges those who would deny the PNC to say something.  As he argues, 




 59. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics Book IV, reprinted in  THE METAPHYSICS 161 (Hugh
Tredennick trans., 1968). 
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truth of PNC.  If they do not, then they have nothing to say.  As I will now 
argue, this is the type of bind facing illiberals.
Let us begin by looking at what the vast majority of illiberals want.  In
the first place, they do not want to live alone in remote caves or perched
on mountaintops.  They also do not want to live in illiberal communes
with no protection from outside forces.  Even if they want to live apart, in 
gated communities, they still want the benefits of living in a society, that 
is, a scheme of cooperation among human beings that enables them to
pursue their conception of the good.  This scheme of cooperation should 
be powerful enough to deter hostile invasions or attacks—whether domestic 
or foreign—that would threaten their way of life. 
In addition, illiberals want to be able to control (or want an illiberal 
majority to be able to control) the machinery of government in their 
society in ways that do not respect liberal principles, such as freedom of 
expression or freedom of action.  It is not just that illiberals want to be left 
alone to live as they choose: illiberals who are committed to way of life 
W want others to be forced to live in accordance with W. A religious 
fundamentalist commits to not having an abortion, but she wants other 
women to be prevented from having abortions too.  A radical Islamist commits 
to life in accordance with Shariah, but he wants others to live according 
to Shariah too.  Someone who thinks that sexual relations between consenting
adults of the same sex is an abomination will commit to sexual relations 
with someone of the opposite sex (or to no sexual relations at all), but he
wants homosexuals not to act on their own sexual inclinations. 
Finally, illiberals do not want to achieve their illiberal ends by beating
others over the head (unless this is absolutely necessary). Instead, they want 
to be free to advocate for, and vote to achieve, the kind of governmental 
control suitable to their ends on the basis of reasons that are grounded in
their own conceptions of the good.
The question is whether all of this is self-consistent. 
In the first place, any argument that the illiberal proposes for his illiberal 
policies commits him to acceptance of basic standards of rationality.
Suppose, for instance, that George is a religious fundamentalist who
believes that ensoulment begins at conception, and who argues as follows: 
(1) fetuses have souls; (2) any ensouled being is a person; (3) persons have
a right to life; (4) the destruction of anything that has a right to life should 
be legally proscribed; (5) abortion involves the destruction of a fetus;
therefore, (C) abortion should be legally proscribed.  Imagine further that
this is the basis on which George votes for a legislator who is working to 
pass an anti-abortion bill on similar grounds.  The very fact that George (or 
the legislator he supports) is employing a deductive argument as a persuasive
tool in support of his goals commits him to basic principles of rationality: 
(i) that the same proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time;
288
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(ii) that every proposition is true or false (or, perhaps, truth-valueless); 
(iii) that validity is a virtue of deductive reasoning; (iv) that any argument
sharing the same logical form as a valid argument must also be valid;
(v) that a given form of reasoning is unsound if it can be used to prove a 
proposition and its negation, and so on.  The general point here is that reliance
on reason as a persuasive rather than merely a rhetorical tool rationally
presupposes commitment to basic logical principles.  It is impossible to
understand, or to follow the recommendations of, someone who abjures 
rational principles in pursuit of his ends.
Suppose now that the illiberal relies on empirical evidence in support 
of any argument designed to sway his fellow citizens. We can imagine
George arguing as follows: (1) causing serious pain to an innocent being 
should be legally proscribed; (2) a twenty-week old fetus feels serious pain 
when its head is crushed; (3) a craniotomy involves crushing the fetus’s 
head as a means of extracting it from the birth canal; therefore, (C) craniotomies
should be legally proscribed.  In this argument, (1) is a normative premise, 
and (3) is a definition, but (2) is an empirical assumption.  The truth of 
empirical assumptions is determined by good inductive reasoning based
on uncontroverted observation and data-gathering.  In this case, George
would appeal to neurobiological theories of pain and facts about the developing
fetal brain in defense of premise (2). And those theories, in turn, are justified 
in part by the scientific method, which involves the use of mathematical/ 
geometrical models, experimental design, and statistical techniques to identify
and map the biochemical mechanisms of pain perception.  It is not rational for
George to appeal to empirically justified assumptions without committing
to the epistemic standards by which these assumptions are justified.  In appealing 
to the results of scientific investigation, George is implicitly endorsing the 
means by which these results are obtained. 
It is worth emphasizing that it would be irrational for George to cabin
his implicit endorsement of the scientific method to matters that pose no
rational threat to his own conception of the good.  To do so without 
justification would be ad hoc, and the abjuring of ad hoc reasoning is a 
mainstay of the scientific method (as it is a mainstay of philosophical 
reasoning).  Suppose, for example, that George bases his opposition to sexual 
relations between consenting adults of the same sex on passages of the Bible
that describe these relations as sinful.  We might reasonably ask George why 
he puts so much stock in the Bible.  His response will likely be that the Bible 
is the revealed word of God.  We might then reasonably ask George why
he thinks that the Bible is the revealed word of God.  What evidence is
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there that the Bible was divinely inspired?  The fact that the Bible is
written as a chronicle of divinely inspired actions is insufficient proof of
its supposed divine status, for it is possible for anyone who is not divinely
inspired to write a chronicle of divinely inspired actions.  In response to
these sorts of criticisms, George might be tempted to claim that the standards
that are supposed to help determine whether chronicles written by present-
day self-described prophets are really divinely inspired do not apply to
the Bible.  But this maneuver would be ad hoc, and hence impermissible
according to the very empirical standards to which George would seek to
appeal in ruling out the possibility that, say, this Article was written by a
goblin or wizard. 
Suppose now that George refuses appeal to the scientific method 
altogether.  It follows that he would be barred from using the anti-craniotomy
argument mentioned above.  But he might find this result acceptable if it 
meant that he could save his defense of the divine origin of the Bible from 
the criticism that it is ad hoc.  Unfortunately, throwing out the scientific 
method will have very serious repercussions on George’s ability to live in 
a world that has been sculpted by the results of scientific investigation. 
Most every artifact used by human beings has been vetted by science.  If
George abjures reliance on science, then he is rationally committed to abjuring 
reliance on modern means of transportation (cars, airplanes), communication 
(cell phones), information transmission (television, Wi-Fi), shelter (skyscrapers), 
food production (synthetic products), sanitation (the sewage system), energy
delivery (electricity, gas), medical care (drugs, surgical procedures), and more.
It would be irrational for George to place a television advertisement, call
his legislator, drive to church, turn on his air conditioner, take painkillers 
for a headache, and do most of the things he takes for granted without 
thinking of the scientific imprimatur they have received. 
My argument thus far has been that illiberals who appeal to deductive 
and inductive arguments to prosecute and impose their own conception of 
the good are implicitly committed to endorsing deductive logic and the 
scientific method (that is, inductive logic).  This puts serious pressure on 
forms of illiberalism that rest exclusively on religious faith or devotion to
a cult (as opposed to, say, natural theology).  But it does not yet rule out 
forms of illiberalism that are, or aim to be, consistent with reason and 
science.  Consider, now, that illiberals want to live in a society with other 
people, some of whom, as they well understand, do not (at least, as yet) 
share their own conceptions of the good. Society is a scheme of cooperation 
for mutual advantage.60  It is a tragedy of modern political life that this
 60. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 20, at 14 (“Thus, justice as 
fairness starts from within a certain political tradition and takes as its fundamental idea 
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fact is mostly invisible, and hence largely unappreciated, by illiberals. 
And yet the fact of cooperation is a pervasive aspect of human life lived
among strangers.  When I go to the grocery store, to the barber, to the 
doctor’s office, to the bank, to my place of work, to a restaurant, to the
movies, and so on, I interact with people I have never met, and yet I trust 
them not to kill me, or harm me, or steal from me.  I simply assume that
they are no more interested in taking advantage of me than I am interested
in taking advantage of them.  This is not because I think that what prevents
them from pouncing on me is primarily the fear of being caught and 
punished by the state.  It is because I assume that, as they also assume, we
are all in this together.  The fact that we are members of a society means
that we have agreed to inhabit and staff a structure that makes it possible 
for us to pursue our conceptions of the good without undue interference. 
The difference between the liberal and the illiberal is that the former,
unlike the latter, wants the scheme of cooperation that structures their 
lives to include the protection of basic liberties, even when these liberties
stand in the way of achieving what some perceive as the good.  But the 
illiberal who chooses not to live on a mountaintop, no less than the liberal 
who makes a similar choice, is subject to the necessary conditions of 
social membership. 
What are these necessary conditions?  As Rawls has argued, any scheme 
of cooperation presupposes terms of cooperation.61  When we agree to live
together and work together, we do so on the basis of mutually agreeable
terms.  If the terms are not mutually agreeable, then the relation that exists
between strangers who are living in close proximity to each other is not 
cooperation; at best, it is a form of uneasy coexistence managed by fear. 
What terms could possibly be mutually agreeable to the illiberal and those 
who do not (at least, as yet) share his conception of the good?  The illiberal
could not possibly agree to terms that involve his being unjustifiably
deprived of his freedom to pursue what he takes to be necessary for his 
happiness. But then, if the terms are to be mutually agreeable, they must
also guarantee the same freedom to others, including those whose conception 
of the good clashes with his.  The Marxist illiberal will not want to be coerced 
to follow Fascist requirements or prohibitions, and the Fascist illiberal will
that of society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next.” 
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
61. See id. at 16 (“Cooperation involves the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these 
are terms that each participant may reasonably accept, provided that everyone else likewise 
accepts them.”).
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not want to be coerced to follow Marxist requirements or prohibitions. Only
terms of cooperation that protect the freedom of the Marxist and the
Fascist to follow their own chosen life paths will be agreeable to each. 
But then, by the very fact of being committed to engaging in a scheme of 
cooperation with others, the illiberal—whether Marxist or Fascist—is thereby
committed to a form of government organized in accordance with liberal 
principles. If this commits the illiberal to a set of mutually contradictory 
commitments, then so be it. 
The upshot of the transcendental argument is that every illiberal faces 
the following dilemma: either live in a society and give up the idea of
coercively foisting one’s own conception of the good on others, or go live 
in a remote area (either alone or with fellow illiberals). From this dilemma, 
there is no escape.
VII. THE INTEGRITY OBJECTION
Illiberals sometimes object that liberal restrictions on the kinds of
arguments that may be offered in support of coercive public policies are 
excessively demanding.62  The “Integrity Objection” posits that no illiberal 
citizen should be forced to cleave his psychology in two, maintaining two 
completely separate personas—one that looks at the world through the 
lens of some particular illiberal ideology, and another that looks at the 
world from a set of doxastic commitments that are, or might be, acceptable 
to his fellow citizens.63 Is it not asking too much of a person that he behave
as a devout Catholic at home and in fellowship with other Catholics, but 
that he disregard his Catholic beliefs when participating in political
arguments in the public square?  Should it not be permissible for a deeply
committed Catholic to try to persuade his fellow citizens on the basis of 
arguments that are ultimately grounded in Catholic dogma?
The answer, in a word, is “no.”  In the first place, no aspect of liberalism 
prevents the illiberal from expressing his deepest convictions in public.
Indeed, it is built into liberalism that the illiberal should have just as much 
right as anyone else to express himself freely.  What liberalism asks of the 
62. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL 
POLITICS (2002); PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 38; MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS, AND LAW (1988) [hereinafter PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW]; KEVIN
VALLIER, LIBERAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC FAITH: BEYOND SEPARATION (2014); Nicholas
Wolterstorff, The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues, in
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL 
DEBATE (1997).
63. For a discussion of opposing views regarding the Integrity Objection, see VALLIER, 
supra note 62, at 59 (explaining that, for certain religious people, “[i]t is their conviction 
that they ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, integration, in their lives”) (quoting 
Wolterstorff, supra note 62, at 67)). 
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illiberal is not that he remain silent, but that he not base his voting
decisions and attempts at public persuasion on his illiberal views.  Second, 
no aspect of liberalism prevents the illiberal from offering conditional 
arguments of the form: “If you accept [fill in with your favorite illiberal
assumptions], then you are rationally committed to accepting public policy
P.” One might think of this form of argument as addressed to fellow
illiberals.  For, although those who do not share the relevant illiberal 
assumptions do not need to discharge the antecedent, this is something 
that those who accept these assumptions are rationally required to do. 
Third, liberalism places no restrictions on what illiberals are permitted to 
think: for, again, freedom of conscience is one of the rights protected in a 
liberal state.64 
Under these conditions, it is not too much to ask the illiberal to refrain
from offering arguments that are: (a) designed to persuade; (b) based on 
his own illiberal assumptions; and (c) designed to support coercive public 
policies. In particular, those who abide by this restriction need not come
to have bifurcated identities.  Illiberals simply need to acknowledge that 
their own desire to live in a society with others necessarily places restrictions 
on what they can say and do in the public square.  It may be that Ben really 
and truly believes that the end times are at hand, and that we should all 
sell our possessions in anticipation of the Second Coming immediately
after next month’s election.  But surely Ben need not consider himself as
having a split identity if he casts his ballot on the assumption that the
world won’t come to an end before the elected body convenes. 
Kevin Vallier claims that the Integrity Objection is best read, not as the 
thought that adhering to restraint is psychologically damaging to illiberals, 
but as the normative thought that illiberals “have no reason to engage in 
integrity-violating restraint.”65  However, as I have argued, this is false: illiberals
who choose to live in a society with others are ipso facto committed, not 
merely to principles of rationality, but also to a liberal principle of restraint. 
Relying in part on Paul J. Weithman, Vallier suggests that in the case 
of religion in particular, “restraint is objectionable in part because it closes
off viable avenues towards realized citizenship,” that is, morally praiseworthy 
involvement in politics.66  For example, African American churches in the
64. For further development of the thoughts in this paragraph, see generally Samuel 
C. Rickless, Religious Arguments and the Duty of Civility, 15 PUB. AFF. Q. 133 (2001). 
65. VALLIER, supra note 62, at 59–60. 
66. Id. at 61 (citation omitted). See generally PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (2002). 
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United States educate their members about political issues and encourage 
them to be politically active.67  Had their members not undertaken their 
political activism as a religious obligation, suggests Vallier, the achievements
of the Civil Rights movement would have been more limited than they 
actually were.68  Vallier also argues that Bishop Tutu’s role on the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa following the demise of 
apartheid would have been “substantially muted” if he had felt the need 
to avoid grounding his political judgments on his religious commitments 
(such as the view that all children of God have the ability to repent).69 
Moreover, Tutu would not have been able to publicly reach many of his
fellow citizens except by appeal to religious values, and thus, if constrained 
by liberal principles, would have been a less effective advocate for truth 
and reconciliation, and for social justice more broadly. 
I disagree. First, the Civil Rights movement was grounded in a basic 
appeal to principles of social justice.  That we should judge people by the 
content of their character rather than by the color of their skin is not a 
specifically religious obligation: it is, first and foremost, a moral obligation.  
And certainly it is possible for an entire movement to be grounded in appeals
to what justice, rather than to what God, demands.  Witness the movement 
for the rights of workers, women’s rights, gay rights, transgender rights, and
the rights of the disabled.  The idea that the Civil Rights movement
would have fallen flat if it had not been driven by religious fervor strikes me
as fanciful at best.  The idea that we are somehow forced to choose between 
a liberal society that permits widespread injustice and an illiberal society
that does not is based on a false dichotomy.
Second, although it may have been difficult for Bishop Tutu to divide 
his political identity from his religious identity as an Anglican Bishop, I
suspect that it would not have been impossible.  You do not need to be 
religious to understand the importance of truth and reconciliation as elements
in the transition from apartheid to a working democracy; moreover, other
members of that body, including Sisi Khampepe (a judge), Wynand Malan
(a politician), Hlengiwe Mkhize (a psychologist), Dumisa Ntsebeza (a 
civil rights attorney), and Faizel Randera (a doctor), were not religious figures. 
Moreover, if Bishop Tutu had found it too difficult to separate his religious 
identity from his political role as chair of the TRC, then it would not have 
been inappropriate to replace him with someone else who was not struggling
with identity issues as much as he.  Indeed, given the TRC’s role as a quasi- 
judicial body, it might have made more sense to appoint Justice Khampepe
 67. VALLIER, supra note 62, at 61. 
68. Id. (arguing that the achievements of the Civil Rights movement would have
been minimized had the African American churches “accepted principles of restraint”).
69. Id. at 63. 
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as chair anyway.  Finally, it simply strains credulity to suggest that religious
citizens of South Africa would have been less inclined to take the work of 
the TRC seriously if it had not been led by a religious figure.  The aim of 
the TRC was not religious: it was to investigate and publicize human rights 
abuses under apartheid, identify candidates for reparation, and make 
recommendations concerning amnesty for past perpetrators.  The idea that 
religious people cannot understand the importance of these functions except 
by placing them within a religious context insults their intelligence and
common sense. 
Vallier goes on to accuse advocates of liberal restraint of elitism: “Restraint
might not be onerous for secular, college-educated citizens of Western 
liberal democracies . . . . But when restraint is applied outside of this privileged 
group, its restrictiveness is clear.”70 Vallier thinks that it is “unduly onerous”
to ask “severely oppressed citizens” who would never have found their
political voices without the religious leadership of Bishop Tutu to distinguish
between arguments that are, and arguments that are not, publicly acceptable
under liberal principles of restraint.71  In other words, Vallier thinks that 
severe oppression somehow stunts a person’s ability to make distinctions. 
This is misguided.  And, to make matters worse, it is also, ironically, elitist. 
Oppression, as should be clear even to those who have not suffered it,
focuses the mind.  Besides, it is insulting and demeaning to suggest that a 
“severely oppressed” religious person without a college degree is not smart 
enough to know the difference between an argument that appeals to God’s
wishes and one that appeals to universal principles of justice. 
70. Id. at 64.  The accusation of elitism has become something of a borderline insult. 
Here, for instance, are some telling comments by Fish: 
Someone sets out to solve the problem presented to a would-be regime of
tolerance or higher-order impartiality or openness of mind or mutual respect by
views that are manifestly intolerant, have no truck with impartiality, and accord 
respect largely to those who already agree with them; and invariably the solution 
that emerges is a mirror version of the problem it claims to address.  Tolerance
is defined in a way that renders the troubling views unworthy to receive it; 
openness of mind turns out to be closed to any form of thought not committed 
to its hegemony, and mutual respect is less a formula for ecumenical generosity
than the cant phrase of a self-selected little club of right-minded academics. 
Fish, supra note 52, at 2293 (emphasis added). 
71. See VALLIER, supra note 62, at 64. 
 295
RICKLESS (DO NOT DELETE) 8/16/2018 4:17 PM     
 
 






    
     
 
  













    
 
 
VIII. THE FAIRNESS OBJECTION
Michael J. Perry, Nicholas Wolsterstorff, and Kevin Vallier press another 
objection to a principle of liberal restraint, namely that such a principle
treats persons of faith unfairly relative to atheists and agnostics.72  The 
concern is that, although restraint does not require secular folk to restrict 
the way in which they argue publicly, it does require this of illiberals who 
want to vote on issues and persuade others on the basis of their own religious
worldview.  Because liberalism treats religious folk unfairly, so the objection 
goes, it consigns them to second-class status in a polity that, according to 
liberalism itself, should be treating all of its members as equals. 
To determine whether anyone is being treated unfairly, we need to determine
the baseline relative to which differential treatment is unwarranted.  It 
must be admitted that liberalism requires that illiberals, but not liberals,
exercise restraint.  But this is unfair only if liberals and illiberals are morally
equal in other respects. And the fact is that they are not.  Illiberals attempt to 
coerce others in the very same society on grounds that are inaccessible— 
or, in some cases, unintelligible—to the latter; liberals, by contrast, do not. 
Moreover, as I have argued, illiberals who want to live in a society with 
others are already rationally committed to avoiding the very sorts of public 
arguments that they are otherwise sorely tempted to use.  Therefore illiberals,
unlike liberals, are in the position of asking for special dispensation to which 
they are not antecedently entitled and that they are antecedently required 
to eschew as a necessary condition of belonging to a scheme of cooperation 
with those who do not share their worldview. 
To make this point plainer, consider the following analogy.  Suppose I 
tell you the following story: 
Lynn, Margaret, and Julie are roommates.  Margaret has a loud voice, while Julie 
has a soft voice.  Lynn tells both Margaret and Julie that they need to keep their
voices down.
Our first reaction to this story is that Lynn may be treating Margaret unfairly, 
given that she is requiring a greater sacrifice from Margaret than she is 
requiring from Julie.  So far, so Vallier.73  But now suppose we fill in the
following missing detail: 
Lynn has an important final exam the next day, and needs a good night’s sleep. 
Both Margaret and Julie previously agreed not to wake Lynn up by making too
much noise in the apartment.
 72. See PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW, supra note 62, at 14–16; VALLIER,
supra note 62, at 66–67; Wolterstorff, supra note 62, at 105. 
73. See VALLIER, supra note 62, at 66–72. 
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Now it no longer strikes us as unfair for Margaret and Julie to be required
to speak softly, even though this is more of an imposition on Margaret
than it is an imposition on Julie.  Similarly, as I have argued, both illiberals 
and liberals who want to live in a single society are committed to terms of 
cooperation that are mutually acceptable to their fellow citizens.  If this 
means that a heavier burden falls on illiberals, then that is not unfair: it is 
no more than justice requires.
IX. CONCLUSION
The justification dilemma establishes that it is impossible to provide a 
compelling argument for liberalism based on premises that the illiberal
could not reasonably reject.  If the premises are derived from some 
comprehensive conception of the good that is incompatible with the
illiberal’s worldview, then the illiberal can complain, reasonably, that it 
would be unfair to force him to accede to the requirements of a competing 
worldview he does not accept. But if the premises are derived instead
from some requirement of neutrality or impartiality, then the illiberal can 
complain, again reasonably, that neutrality is too thin a grounding for the
liberal state. The best way to argue for liberalism is to turn the tables on
the illiberal who seeks to persuade other citizens to follow his own conception
of the good.  For it is a precondition of adopting such an end that one commit 
to the requirements of deductive and inductive reasoning, and it is a 
precondition of living in a society that one cooperate with one’s fellow citizens 
on the basis of mutually agreeable terms.  In addition, there is no reason
to believe that illiberals who obey principles of liberal restraint need to live
with bifurcated identities, or that requiring adherence to these principles is
an elitist way of closing off viable avenues to realized citizenship.  And it is
not unfair to require illiberals to avoid grounding their public arguments 
for coercive government policies in their own inaccessible, unshareable 
conceptions of the good. Politics need not involve a fragile modus vivendi
or a mere continuation of war by other means: liberalism, along with the 
principles of restraint it requires of all citizens, is a necessary condition of 
the very possibility of illiberalism.
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